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Note

WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DENIAL
OF MEANINGFUL DUE PROCESS IN SCHOOL
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN OHIO
GENEVIEVE VINCE*
ABSTRACT
Students face many different obstacles in school and arbitrary exclusion should
not be one of them. Despite the Supreme Court stating that students do not shed their
rights at the schoolhouse gate, they in fact do shed their rights. This Note examines
how school disciplinary actions deny students meaningful due process. It discusses
the foundation of modern due process, including what other rights have been
incorporated into the contemporary understanding of due process as well as its
historic roots. Additionally, this Note explores the case that established the
procedures required of school administrators to comport with a student’s right to due
process, Goss v. Lopez. Finally, this Note argues why Goss’s protections do not
amount to meaningful due process and how denial of meaningful due process in
school disciplinary actions can have lasting negative implications on students’
futures beyond the schoolhouse gate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a citizen being denied meaningful due process merely because she
belongs to a certain class of people. When the citizen is accused of an offense,
authority figures need not listen to what the accused has to say because truly
examining the situation would be too time consuming. The law permits the authority
figure to act as judge and jury and quickly dispose of the matter without scrutinizing
the facts presented. Authority figures can hand citizens a punishment that remains on
their record and affects their future. The citizen can appeal the punishment; however,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, J.D. expected May 2017. Special thanks to Jeffrey
Fry, Kate Lutz, Jeffrey Shane, Julie Mazzei, and David Forte for being educators who
challenged me and inspired me to work harder.
*
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her appellate rights are not meaningful either, as the appellate panel is more than
willing to defer to the authority figure’s judgment. Now, the punishment is
permanently on the citizen’s record and follows her throughout life, thereby
hampering opportunities and making it harder for her to succeed. Imagine a world
where state and federal law implements this discrimination and makes this form of
discrimination legal.
This is infuriating, right? It sounds like a story straight out of pre-civil rights
America. Except, it is not. This is a modern phenomenon that affects citizens every
day. But in the year 2017, with the internet, social media, and activists galore, how
could an injustice like this go unnoticed? Furthermore, where is this happening, to
whom is this happening, and why do so few know or seem to care about it? It is
closer than one would think; in fact, most people have probably seen or heard stories
like this without realizing it involved class discrimination. So, who is this class of
people? The class of people is minor students, and the discrimination they face lurks
behind news stories such as “8th grader Suspended for Kool-Aid, Sugar, ‘Crack;’”
“12-year-old boy Suspended for Staring at a Girl;” and “Parents Sue School, Police
over High School Students’ Rap Video Expulsions.” 1
While the headlines seem irrational, stories like these are surprisingly common. 2
Each story involves a student excluded from school for something trivial, and these
disproportionate actions are all made possible, not through state or federal law, but
via the 1975 Supreme Court case Goss v. Lopez.3 Goss established that access to
public education is a property interest that the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 4 The
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from a government body, such as
administrators in a publicly funded school,5 to deprive citizens of their life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. 6 However, this protection is not absolute.
The U.S. Constitution permits the government to deprive an individual of life,
liberty, or property so long as the state actor affords the individual due process of the
law.7 Therefore, when a school suspends or expels a student for prohibited behavior,
the disciplinary action qualifies as a government body depriving an individual of his

1 Michael Baldwin, 12-Year-Old Boy Suspended for Staring at Girl, FOX19.COM (Sept.
30, 2015), http://www.fox19.com/story/30158100/12-year-old-boy-suspended-for-staring-atgirl; Homa Bash, 8th Grader Suspended for Kool-Aid, Sugar ‘Crack’, NEWSNET5 CLEVELAND
(Sept.
30,
2015),
http://www.newsnet5.com/news/local-news/oh-summit/8th-gradersuspended-for-kool-aid-sugar-crack; Lucy May, Parents Sue Cincinnati-Area School District,
Police Over High School Students’ Rap Video Expulsion, WCPO CINCINNATI (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news/parents-sue-northwest-local-schools-colerain-policeover-high-school-students-rap-video-expulsions.
2 When searching Google News for “student suspended for,” several of the news stories
recalled took place in Ohio. Other well represented states included Texas, Virginia, and South
Carolina.
3

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).

4

Id. at 574.

5

Id.; see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943).

6

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

7

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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or her property.8 Accordingly, Goss held that students facing exclusion were entitled
to due process of law.
Goss established two procedural requirements that schools must follow to
suspend or expel a student while comporting with the student’s constitutional right to
due process. 9 These procedural requirements, however, amount to no more than
inconvenient administrative red tape masquerading as substantive student
protections. This deception results in such headlines that highlight unreasonable,
illogical, and arbitrary justifications for excluding a student from school. Goss does
not protect students as originally intended. Instead, the case allows schools to
truncate the students’ constitutional right to due process.
This Note will show that students are unfairly denied meaningful due process of
law when facing disciplinary actions at school. Part II will discuss the history of due
process as well as important concepts absorbed into the contemporary definition.
Part III will explore the history of Goss v. Lopez, including the Court’s established
protections and concerns raised in the dissent. Part IV will analyze the practical
application of Goss and illustrate how the procedures created in the majority opinion
permit schools to unfairly deprive students of their property without meaningful due
process of law. Additionally, Part IV will highlight the seriousness of school
disciplinary actions and how truncating students’ right to due process hurts their
future. Finally, Part V will propose a solution to protect students where the
procedures created by Goss fall short.
II. DUE PROCESS
The phrase “due process” first appeared in English statutes interpreting the
Magna Carta in 1354 A.D.10 Originally, due process was only a technical
requirement.11 Due process mandated that the court provide an accused party with
notice of a hearing regarding an issue in contention so that the accused could
respond to the accusation.12 Over time, the definition and implications of due process
changed as the idea absorbed additional concepts.13 In the United States, due process
absorbed several concepts from the Bill of Rights in an effort to ensure the
meaningfulness of an accused party’s legal response. 14 Furthermore, due process
incorporated the principles of legality, which assured that laws were fair
8 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
9
10

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-84.
A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 14-15 (1964).

11 Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST.
COMMENT. 339, 340 (1987).

Gary Lawson, Due Process Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 439,
439-40 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., rev. 2d ed. 2014).
12

13 See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY
L.J. 585 (2009).
14 Francis W. Bird, Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 46 (1913).
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commands.15 By including the concepts that protected the rights of the accused party,
due process shifted from a technical procedure into an amorphous concept that
became synonymous with a “fair trial.”16 Notice, protections from the Bill of Rights,
and the principles of legality weave the pattern currently known as due process.
A. The Principles of Legality: The Quality Assurance of Law
The principles of legality are rules and reasons that make commands legally
binding.17 These principles establish that laws are fair in nature when they are clear
and ascertainable.18 Indeed, to uphold the integrity of laws, the decision maker
cannot use discretion to depart from previously established and agreed upon rules. 19
In practicality, the principles of legality encompass all the reasons why the Court
would strike down a law as substantively unfair, flawed, and unconstitutional.20 For
example, one principle requires that a law be publicly promulgated. 21 Secret decrees
cannot be laws because people have no notice as to what behaviors the law
prohibits.22
Another principle states that a law cannot be arbitrary; it must be rational or
rationally related to the purpose of the law. 23 If, for example, a law intends to prevent
highway accidents by prohibiting trucks from hauling two trailers but statistics show
that trucks hauling one trailer cause significantly more accidents than trucks hauling
two trailers, the law is arbitrary because the means employed do not achieve the
stated purpose of the law.24 A law that employs means unrelated to the end sought is
irrational. Accordingly, that law would violate a principle of legality.25
15

Lawson, supra note 12, at 439-40.

See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 564 (1972); see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 260-71 (1970); Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 200-01 (1951); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska state law prohibiting teachers from teaching the
German language to students who had not yet passed the eighth grade because the law was
“arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any legitimate state goal”); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915); ICC v. Louisville &
Ashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No., 108, 111 U.S.
701, 707 (1884); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 281-86
(1856).
16

John C. Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV.
493, 530-43 (1997).
17

18 Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 355, 356-59 (2005).
19

Id. at 375-77.

20 Harrison, supra note 17, at 525-43; see generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
21

FULLER, supra note 20, at 157-59.

22

Id.

23

Harrison, supra note 17, at 499-501.

24

Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 694 (1981).

25

Id. at 662; Lawson, supra note 12, at 439-40; Harrison, supra note 17, at 530.
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Yet another principle of legality is that a law must be crafted so that the public is
able to comply with it.26 If the people cannot comply with a law and are accordingly
guilty from the start, people lack adequate notice, and the law would violate a
principle of legality.27 Furthermore, a law can be void for vagueness. 28 If a law is so
convoluted in its wording that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand
what it binds him or her to do or not to do, that law is void for vagueness. 29 Similar
to the way secret decrees violate the principles of legality for not providing the
public with notice as to what behaviors are prohibited, a statute held to be void for
vagueness does not provide adequate notice as to what behaviors are prohibited. 30
Going further, the law must be capable of faithful administration and
implementation. When crafted, a law cannot leave significant discretion to law
enforcement because significant discretion results in inconsistent application,
creating arbitrary and irrational results. 31 This inconsistency fails to comport with a
principle of legality and ultimately fails the due process requirement of the law. 32
Each of these principles helps expand and illustrate the idea of contemporary
American due process. These elements are required of a law to make it a fair
command, so the public can comply with it.
B. Natural Law: The Root of Fairness
The rationale at the root of due process lies within the concept of natural law.
The idea of natural law began as far back as Aristotle who stated that if one were to
look at the nature of the human being with all its complexities and nuances, one
would see an intrinsic order of purposefulness or reason that guides one’s choices. 33
This purposefulness is free will, which is a crucial aspect of natural law.34 The rule
of law should respect natural law.35 When the rule of law respects natural law,
citizens, of their own free will, enter into a covenant with the government by which
the citizens agree to abide by the laws so long as the laws continue to respect natural

26

FULLER, supra note 20, at 130-31.

27

Id.

28

Robinson, supra note 18, at 356-63.

Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 67, 67-68 (1960).
29

30

Id.

31

FULLER, supra note 20, at 209-12.

32

Id.

See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA
OF THEOLOGY (1266-1273), reprinted in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS: A
NEW TRANSLATION, BACKGROUNDS, INTERPRETATIONS (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., Norton
critical ed. 1988).
33

34

Kent Greenfield, Free Will Paradigms, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2011).

35

See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 33; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 33.
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law.36 A respectful law acknowledges the values, norms, and rules by which a human
should be treated and respected.37
The most famous enumeration of rights rooted in natural law is the Declaration
of Independence. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the basic values,
norms, and rules of personhood that the government is to respect.38 Humanity in its
nature demands life be respected and that people have the liberty to permit reason to
guide their choices.39 The pursuit of happiness is how people develop themselves
into more perfect beings.40 Natural law holds that there are these certain attributes to
personhood that are inalienable, irreducible, and cannot arbitrarily be taken away. 41
As Chief Justice John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, “The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men.”42 If a law does not respect natural law, it is a command demanding
subservience without an agreed upon justification. Such a law is the arbitrary rule of
man and not within the terms of the agreement between the people and the U.S.
government.43 The agreement to respect natural law is the very root of the rule of
law, the principles of legality, and ultimately, due process to which all citizens are
entitled—that is, until Goss v. Lopez in 1975.
III. GOSS V. LOPEZ
Goss v. Lopez, originally hailed as a seminal case for students’ rights, created
procedures that failed to protect students from a school’s arbitrary disciplinary
actions.44 In Goss, the school gave nine students each a ten-day suspension for
destruction of school property and disruption of a learning environment. 45 Ohio state
law required school administrators to provide procedural due process to any students
facing suspension longer than ten days. 46 The required procedure both consisted of
notice no later than twenty-four hours from the time of the disciplinary action that
stated the reason for the suspension and required administrators to provide students
with an informal hearing regarding the conduct that led to the suspension. 47 Ohio law
See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 33; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 33.

36

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 164 (1803); see also Kevin F. Ryan, We Hold
These Truths, 31 WTR VT. B.J. 9, 11 (2005-2006).
37

38 Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in our
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
457, 470 (2011).

RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 41-43
(1998); Charles, supra note 38, at 506.
39

40

BARNETT, supra note 39, at 73; Charles, supra note 38, at 477-502.

41

Charles, supra note 38, at 481-82.

42

Marbury, 5 U.S. at 164; see Ryan, supra note 37, at 11.

43

See generally HENRY THOMAS, THE LIVING WORLD OF PHILOSOPHY (1946).

44

MARY A. LENTZ, LENTZ SCHOOL SECURITY § 1:4, Westlaw (database updated Dec.

2014).
45

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 568 (1975).

46

Id. at 567.

47

Id. at 596 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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further required school administrators to notify the student of his or her right to
appeal the decision to the school board.48
This particular Ohio law, however, was silent on any procedural requirements for
students facing suspensions of ten days or less.49 Because the students in Goss were
suspended for ten days, state law did not require the school to provide the students
with procedural due process.50 The students filed suit seeking a declaration that the
statute, which permitted the school to deny them procedural due process, was
unconstitutional.51 The students also sought to enjoin the school from issuing other
suspensions that under the same law would not be entitled to procedural due
process.52 The district court held that the statute in question violated the students’
constitutional right to due process and granted both the declaration and injunction. 53
The school board appealed the decision all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court. 54
The school board’s main argument was that any suspension lasting ten days or less
only constituted a de minimis deprivation of property and was not substantial enough
to require procedural due process. 55
In a narrow 5-4 decision striking down the statute, the Court stated that not
affording the students with a hearing before handing down the suspensions violated
their rights to due process of law prior to deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 56
The Court reasoned that “entitlement to a public education” is a property interest,
and, as a property interest, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protected students from the state arbitrarily depriving them of that property interest. 57
The Court reasoned that even though Ohio was not constitutionally obligated to
“establish and maintain a public school system,” the fact that the state offered and
mandated attendance created a legal entitlement that a government body, such as the
school board, could not arbitrarily withdraw “absent fundamentally fair procedures
to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.” 58 Overall, Goss provided further

48

Id. at 567 (majority opinion); see OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015).

49

OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015).

50

Goss, 419 U.S. at 571.

51

Id. at 568-69.

52

Id. at 569.

53

Id. at 571.

“Because the order below granted plaintiffs’ request for an injunction—ordering
defendants to expunge their records—this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1253.” Id. at 572.
54

55

Id. at 575-76.

56

Id. at 584.

Id. at 574. While the Court has been more uniform when determining what interests
constitute deprivation of life, the interests that qualify as liberty or property have been a gray
area. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
57

58

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
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affirmation that students retain their constitutional protections while they are in
school.59
Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice
Rehnquist joined, dissented, stating that the majority’s decision was an intrusion into
the operation of public schools and opened a door for judicial intervention which had
the potential to “affect adversely the quality of education.”60 Justice Powell first
argued that public education was not a right but rather an entitlement.61 As an
entitlement, students did not have a right to procedural due process outside of what
state law created for them.62 Furthermore, even if access to education was a right,
students did not possess the right to discipline-free education.63 Thus, schools not
providing students with notice and a hearing before disciplining them would not
truly violate their right to education.64
Justice Powell then argued that the procedures described in the majority opinion
would unduly burden schools to the point of dysfunction.65 Justice Powell stated that
school boards have great swaths of disciplinary discretion because each school
operates in a different community that has different needs. 66 Justice Powell argued
that to serve a school’s diverse set of needs in maintaining discipline, school boards
need to have significant amounts of discretion regarding their disciplinary policies. 67
Justice Powell further argued that “one-size-fits-all” types of policies tie the hands of
the administrators.68 He alluded to the fact that some schools implement more
disciplinary actions than average and that by requiring staff to provide notice and
59 Id. The first seminal case for student civil rights was Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Comty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, several students filed suit seeking damages
and an injunction against enforcement of a rule created by their school’s principal prohibiting
the students from wearing black armbands. The students along with other adults in the
community decided to demonstrate their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam by all wearing
black armbands on a particular day. The school principal learned of the plan and established
the rule prohibiting students from wearing the armbands. When the students wore their
armbands anyway, they were suspended “until they would come back without their
armbands.” Id. at 504. The Court held that the school had no evidence that wearing the
armbands would have caused a substantial disruption of the learning environment and absent
such evidence, the arbitrary prohibition violated the students’ right to expression under the
First Amendment. The Court reasoned that “it can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” Id. at 506.
60

Goss, 419 U.S. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting).

61

Id. at 586.

62

Id. at 586-89.

63

Id. at 586.

64

Id. at 587-89.

65

Id. at 591-92.

“In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized that school authorities must
have broad discretionary authority in the daily operations of public schools. This includes
wide latitude with respect to maintaining discipline and good order.” Id. at 589-90.
66

67

Id. at 591-92.

68

Id. at 592-93.
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conduct a hearing, the disciplinary actions would pile up and require more attention;
attention which would be taken away from providing the other students with a
quality education.69
Furthermore, Justice Powell argued that the requirements set forth in the
majority opinion would not protect students the way the majority thought it would. 70
Justice Powell stated that the statute the majority had just invalidated provided more
protection to students than the Court’s new procedures ever could. 71 Under the
invalidated law, the principal taking the disciplinary action was required to notify not
just the student, but also the student’s parents and the school district’s board of
education.72 Under the Goss majority, schools only have to notify the student.73
Justice Powell further argued that the hearing Goss afforded to students would not
provide more protection than was already available, as the majority opinion did not
change the substance of what would constitute an appropriate hearing. 74 Finally,
Justice Powell noted that even if a student were subjected to an arbitrary suspension
of ten days or less, that time period would not be substantial enough to justify
additional protection and that such an action could easily be remedied without
involving the judiciary.75
More than forty years have passed since the Court decided Goss, and
unfortunately, many of the concerns raised by Justice Powell in his dissent were
accurate.76 Goss was touted as a major win for students’ rights when in reality it has
not resulted in real protections for students. 77 Besides affirming prior cases holding
that students had civil rights while in school, the practical application of the hearing
and notice requirements established under Goss have shown that students do in fact
shed some of their civil rights at the school house gate. 78 The notice and hearing

69
“[The majority opinion] also demonstrate[s] that if hearings were required for a
substantial percentage of short-term suspensions, school authorities would have time to do
little else.” Id. at 592.
70

Id. at 595-97.

71

Id. at 596.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 595-96.

75 Id. at 589 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Brannon Heath, Constitutional Law: Goss v.
Lopez: Much Ado About Nothing or the Tempest, 7 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 193 (1976).

Michael A. Ellis, Procedural Due Process after Goss v. Lopez, 1976 DUKE L.J. 409,
430 (1976) (arguing that the Court’s reluctance to adopt true procedural protections due to the
potential burden on the school administration dilutes the importance of procedural due process
in that the truncated procedural due process sends the message to students that their right to
due process need not be taken seriously).
76

77 Powell’s statement that arbitrary actions are easily remedied without judicial
intervention has turned out to be untrue as seen by the mass quantities of case law and
anecdotes regarding the subject.
78 Id.; see Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 63 F. Supp. 3d 418, 448-50 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(holding that procedural due process rights were not violated by not affording an “informal
give-and-take” before dismissing a student); see also Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 64
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requirements described in Goss do not substantively protect students.79 The
requirements merely created administrative red tape.
IV. STUDENTS SHED THEIR RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL DUE PROCESS AT THE SCHOOL
HOUSE GATE
To illustrate the full effect of Goss’s shortcomings, let us follow a hypothetical
disciplinary action from start to end. Imagine that Susy, a senior in high school, is
from Ohio and is generally regarded as a good student. One day, Susy’s classmate
takes her purse and discharges Susy’s pepper spray. Susy’s teacher instructs her to
go to the principal’s office. Once in the office, Susy is told to write down what
happened and given the opportunity to call her parents. Once her parents arrive, the
principal, vice principal, and guidance counselor inform Susy and her parents that
Susy is being suspended for disruption of class and that Susy has a right to appeal
the decision to the school board.
In this situation, the first questions a parent might ask are, “How can I fight
this?” or “What can I do to remedy the situation?” You believe the action is arbitrary
because pepper spray is a legal substance. Susy was not the person who discharged
the canister. Indeed, the student code of conduct does not explicitly or implicitly ban
the substance. After all, how could Susy have known she was not permitted to
possess the pepper spray if she had no prior notice? You notify the school of your
intention to appeal the suspension. You go through the appeals process, and the
principal informs you that the school board upheld the suspension. You feel your
child’s rights were violated but are unaware of what specific right was violated. The
only recourse left would be to sue the school. Surely there has to be something—
some cause of action for which you and your daughter are entitled relief! But what
relief? Let us examine the process established in Goss to see what rights could be
violated, how they could be violated, and where in the disciplinary process the
violation could occur.
Recall that in Goss v. Lopez, the Court held that “entitlement to a public
education” is a legally enforceable property interest, and as a property interest, the
Due Process Clause protects students from the state arbitrarily depriving them of
their property.80 The Court further stated that a governmental body, such as the
school board, could not arbitrarily withdraw that right based on misconduct “absent
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether [the requisite] misconduct has
occurred.”81 Therefore, in order for a school to withdraw a student’s right to public
education through disciplinary suspension, the school must provide “fundamentally
fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.” 82 This restriction
over the school raises the question of what constitutes fundamentally fair procedures.
S.W.3d 559 (Tex. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that the school’s failure to inform the student of a
right to appeal did not violate due process).
79 See Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 447-48; see also Stafford, 64 S.W.3d at 559; see also
Grine v. Sylvania Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. L-04-1137, 2004 WL 2924335, 2004 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6393 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2004).
80

Goss, 419 U.S. at 565; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015); see also Stafford, 64
S.W.3d at 559; Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1972).
81

82

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
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Upon determination that any removal from school constituted deprivation of
property, regardless of the extent or duration, the Court established what
fundamentally fair procedures look like in the school removal context. 83 The Court
reasoned that due process is rooted in “the opportunity to be heard” and the
opportunity to be heard only arises if “one is informed that the matter is pending.” 84
History has agreed with this concept and expanded upon it by incorporating other
procedural protections, such as the right to counsel or the right to a jury trial, under
the due process umbrella.85 After all, notice is worthless if the rules of court are such
that the answer of the accused cannot be effectively heard. Based on this principle,
the Court held that students facing out-of-school suspension must be given “some
kind of notice” of the reason for the possible property deprivation and “some kind of
hearing” regarding the validity of the deprivation. 86
“Some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing” are the two components of
fundamentally fair procedure; however, the majority opinion never addressed what
either means.87 Because neither of these procedural requirements was adequately
defined in Goss, subsequent case law has shaped what appropriate notice and hearing
for school disciplinary actions look like.88
A. Some Kind of Notice
As it currently stands, “some kind of notice” means that the school must inform
the student what behavior or action justifies the suspension. 89 The student code of
conduct need not explicitly state that this specific behavior is prohibited.90 So long as
83 The administration in Goss argued that even if public education was a property interest
protected by due process, the procedural requirements only come into play when the student is
facing a “severe detriment or grievous loss,” and that a ten-day suspension was not severe
enough to require due process. Id. at 576, 583-84.
84 Id. at 579; see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-69 (1951); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Tr. Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).

See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.
313 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see also
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
85

86

Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.

87

Id. at 579; see also Ellis, supra note 76, at 422-30; Heath, supra note 75, at 206-10.

“It also appears . . . that the . . . content of the notice . . . will depend on appropriate
accommodation of the competing interests involved.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 579; see also
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961).
88

89 See C.Y. ex rel. Antone v. Lakeview Pub. Sch., 557 F. App’x 426 (6th Cir. 2014); see
also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir.
2000); Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1998).
90 See Krista Gesaman, Student Media Guide to Due Process Claims, STUDENT PRESS
LAW CTR., http://www.splc.org/article/2014/11/due-process-claims (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
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the school administration deems the student’s behavior to reasonably fall within a
certain category, the act of informing a student of the code that he or she violated is
sufficient notice.91 This is far removed from the modern definition of due process.92
Technical due process requires notice; however, contemporary due process requires
the notice to be meaningful.93 Modern due process includes procedural safeguards
from the Bill of Rights and the principles of legality into the notice requirement so
that an accused party may have his or her answer heard effectively, making that
answer meaningful.94 The notice requirement under Goss is not meaningful. It moves
away from the incorporation trend by permitting schools to deny students basic
procedural safeguards.95 Notice of a disciplinary action under Goss does not provide
the accused with the procedurally fair trial that due process has come to mean
today.96
“Some kind of notice” raises a second tangential issue. Goss held that notice is
required and that the notice must tell students why they are being suspended. 97
However, suspensions become news headlines because of the severe punishment
arising from a seemingly trivial offense that most likely never actually appeared in
the student code of conduct. This pattern raises the question as to why school
administrators are given substantial discretion in determining what constitutes
prohibited behavior in the first place.
The Goss majority and dissenting opinions highlighted the need for school
boards of education and administrators to have wide swaths of discretion so that the
unique needs of each school could be adequately served.98 The results of such
91 Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 78 F. Supp. 2d 812 (C.D. Ill.
2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001).
92 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (stating that the very nature and spirit of the U.S.
government as well as the general principles of law and reason forbid ex post facto laws which
are “law[s] that punish[] a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which,
when done was in violation of no existing law”).
93 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). A fundamental component of due process is
the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
94 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.
313 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

Benjamin E. Friedman, Protecting Truth: An Argument for Juvenile Rights and a
Return to In re Gault, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 165, 166-67 (2011).
95

96 In fact, allowing administrators to punish students for violating the code of conduct for
conduct that is not actually included in the code is arguably an ex post facto law in that it
“criminalizes” behaviors after the fact. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). How is a
student supposed to fully comply with the code of conduct if certain behaviors are not listed?
97

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).

Id. at 584, 592-94. Upon research into Ohio’s laws, Ohio Department of Education
regulations, and the county boards of education, state law is the only guidance that local
school boards have when creating their codes of conduct. Neither the Department of
98
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discretion are codes of conduct, which enumerate prohibited “categories” of
behavior for which a student could be suspended or expelled; these categories are so
generalized and ambiguous that any conduct could potentially fall within one.99 For
example, many codes of conduct prohibit aiding and abetting, disrespect, disruptive
behavior, insubordination, unauthorized materials, and unauthorized touching. 100
While codes of conduct attempt to define each infraction, the definitions still fall
short of giving a student adequate and meaningful notice as to what behaviors and
actions are prohibited.101
If one were to compare student codes of conduct, one would notice that the
definitions of these prohibited categories of behavior are comparable but encompass
different behaviors at different schools. For example, Susy’s pepper spray incident
occurred in Ohio. If Susy attended Revere High School in northeastern Ohio, she
could be suspended because Revere’s definition of “Fireworks/Dangerous
Instruments or Materials” actually includes possession and use of pepper spray.” 102 If
Susy attended Hamilton Township High School near Columbus, the school could
suspend her for “disruption of school or class,” “inducing panic or reckless
behavior,” or for possessing “weapons/dangerous instruments.” 103 If Susy attended
Education nor the county boards of education have much—if any—say in the substantive
content that goes into a school’s code of conduct.
99 This would be like the Ohio Revised Code including a law that made it a crime to
“harm people with a baseball bat.” That leaves several questions as to what constitutes
harming a person. Does morally offending someone count as harming a person? How about
simply making someone slightly uncomfortable? Depending on who is enforcing the law at
the time, that executive official could subjectively believe moral offense and uncomfortable
feelings fall under the umbrella and arrest someone for “harming a person with a baseball
bat.” There is simply no notice and the statute is far too overbroad.

GREENVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY,
GREENVILLE, OHIO (2015); IRONTON CITY SCHOOLS, IRONTON HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT/PARENT
HANDBOOK, IRONTON, OHIO (2015); REVERE LOCAL SCHOOLS, REVERE HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENT HANDBOOK, RICHFIELD, OHIO (2015); HAMILTON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
HAMILTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, COLUMBUS, OHIO (2015);
MARIETTA CITY SCHOOLS, MARIETTA HIGH SCHOOL HANDBOOK, MARIETTA, OHIO (2015).
Each of these five schools was picked on two conditions; each needed to have between 8001000 students, as well as be from one of the four corners, or sides of Ohio, with one from
Columbus.
100

101 For example, the Revere High School Handbook states that students are prohibited
from the “unauthorized use and/or distribution of over-the-counter medication.” REVERE HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100. However, nowhere in the handbook does it
state what “authorized use” is. Accordingly, a student could potentially be suspended for
taking his or her own Motrin for a headache or giving Midol to a friend for menstrual cramps.
And for that matter, what is authorized touching?
102 Pepper spray was only added to the student code of conduct for the first time beginning
in the 2009-2010 school year. Id. at 16, 20; REVERE LOCAL SCHOOLS, REVERE HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENT HANDBOOK, RICHFIELD, OHIO (2009); REVERE LOCAL SCHOOLS, REVERE HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, RICHFIELD, OHIO (2008).
103 Notably, Hamilton Township High School also lists “holding hands” as an example of
a prohibited display of affection. Thus, technically, a student could be suspended for holding
hands with another student. Displays of Affection, in HAMILTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 23.
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Greenville High School in western Ohio, the school would suspend her for
possession of a dangerous weapon on campus, as pepper spray is likely what the
board of education contemplated when the board prohibited “possession of noxious
irritation or poisonous gas.”104
These differences are concerning because if a state law lacked uniformity to a
similar degree as these codes of conduct do, the law would be struck down for lack
of due process (i.e., the law fails to provide adequate notice and is thus unfair). 105
The principles of legality at the root of modern due process require laws to be
rational, not arbitrary, able to be obeyed, and faithfully or equally applied. This lack
of uniformity is not rational. The true definition of what constitutes aiding and
abetting does not change based on a school’s regional needs. Either a student helped
another student violate the code of conduct or not. There is no need to give a school
discretion in defining such offenses.106 Because it is irrational, it is also arbitrary and
difficult for students to obey. 107
Furthermore, students should be able to rely on public schools as government
institutions to prohibit substantially similar—if not identical—behaviors in their
codes of conduct.108 The fact that different schools define their offenses differently,
combined with the amount of individual discretion that determines whether or not an
offense was committed, results in unequal and, frankly, unfaithful administration of
these school codes.109 Pepper spray is an excellent example. It is a common and legal
personal safety device in the state of Ohio. 110 How would a student know that a legal
substance was banned in his or her school without adequate notice? While it is
understandable that schools want to prohibit its presence on campus due to the
possibility of it discharging, schools cannot ignore the fact that crime can happen
104 Furthermore, pepper spray is prohibited from the Greenville High School campus
entirely and thus, a student can be punished for having pepper spray in their car. Possession of
Dangerous Weapons on Campus, in GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at
29.
105 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (stating unconstitutionally vague
statutes fail to define offenses with sufficient particularity and fail to encourage non-arbitrary
enforcement); see also Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 49495 (1982) (holding that a statute must be vague in all of its applications in order to be
considered unconstitutionally void for vagueness).
106

It would be like each school publishing its own dictionary of the English language.

107

Harrison, supra note 17, at 499-501.

“Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more
than simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also
helps to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence
of law itself.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996).
108

109 Daniel Losen et al., Are We Closing the School Discipline Gap?, CTR. FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS REMEDIES 1 (Feb. 2015) (stating that there is “tremendous disparity in the risk for
suspension according to students’ race, gender, and disability status”); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Issue Brief No. 1, in CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION DATA
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (Mar. 2014) (“Black students are suspended and expelled at
a rate three times greater than white students”).
110 Note that pepper spray is not legally a dangerous weapon in Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2923.11(2015).
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anywhere. Suburban school districts are not exempt. 111 Just because a school parking
lot has lights does not mean that Susy is safe when she walks to her car after the sun
goes down.112
B. Some Kind of Hearing
The other area where Goss is severely lacking is the requirement for “some kind
of hearing.” The hearing requirement is just as ambiguous and ineffective as the
notice requirement. In the majority opinion for Goss, Justice White noted that
procedural due process stems from the “opportunity to be heard.” 113 Thus far, “the
opportunity to be heard” has become the sole requirement for “some kind of
hearing.”114 So long as a school’s administration permits the student to make a
statement, the hearing requirement of due process is met. 115 “[O]nce school
administrators tell a student what they heard or saw, ask why they heard or saw it,
and allow a brief response, a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth
Amendment demands.”116
Furthermore, this “hearing” does not require school administrators to scrutinize
the events that allegedly took place.117 In criminal law, a hearing that comports with
the defendant’s due process rights involves the accused having a chance to face and
question his or her accuser, providing witnesses to corroborate the defendant’s
version of events, and having the burden of proof rest with the prosecution to prove
that the accused violated the law.118 A hearing in the school context does not require
the administration to truly examine the alleged series of events. Nor does the hearing
even permit students to provide witnesses to corroborate their version of events.
Thus, the “hearing” becomes a game of what the staff member says versus what the
111

See SIMONE ROBERS

ET AL.,

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE
SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2014 (2015).

OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, INDICATORS OF

112 Car Jacking, Kidnapping, High School Parking Lot Robbery Suspect Arrested,
TRISTATE HOMEPAGE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www. tristatehomepage.com/news/newscarousel/car-jacking-kidnapping-high-school-parking-lot-robbery-suspect-arrested; Stephen
Satterly, School Kidnapping Case Ends in Sentence, SAFE HAVENS INT’L (July 22, 2014)
http://safehavens international.org/school-kidnapping-case-ends-sentence/.
113 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1975); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-64, 178
(1951); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914).

See C.Y. ex rel. Antone v. Lakeview Pub. Sch., 557 F. App’x 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2014)
(stating due process fundamentally includes an opportunity to be heard); see also Seal v.
Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 573 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating procedural due process is “often
summarized as ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard’”).
114

See Antone, 557 F. App’x at 430 (stating that so long as the student is told what the
offense was and given an opportunity to respond to the accusation, a school will have met its
requirements under the Due Process Clause); see also Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d
1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1996).
115

116 C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 386 (11th Cir. 1996). Now imagine if a judge were to say
that at an arrestee’s initial hearing.
117

Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see Ellis, supra note 76, at 423.

118

U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(e).
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student says, and the administrator gets to decide which story he or she believes
more.119
As professional colleagues, school administrators are partial to the judgment of a
teacher. When a parent challenges a teacher’s judgment, teachers are more likely to
support their colleague rather than question their colleague’s judgment. 120 The entire
process is far from a real truth-seeking process. It is a quick means to a quicker
end.121 Accordingly, while students do not shed their constitutional rights at the
school house gate, those rights are truncated in the name of school convenience and
discretion.122
While not saying what the hearing should be, the majority in Goss did state that
the hearing would not be a “full-fledged, trial-type evidentiary hearing.”123 The
Court reasoned that school disciplinary actions are numerous enough that requiring a
full trial-type hearing would overwhelm the administration so severely that the cost
of protecting students from arbitrary actions would greatly outweigh the benefit
students could receive.124 Essentially, the majority stated that “full-fledged” trial
formalities were unnecessary to comport with student due process rights because,
based on balancing student interests with faculty needs, the faculty’s need for
efficiency and expediency is a more compelling interest. 125
This outcome is concerning on several levels. First, it is not within the spirit of
the law to deprive a single person of his or her constitutional rights in the name of
efficiency. The Bill of Rights enumerates the most basic human rights that are not to
be taken away without serious scrutiny and legitimate justification. 126 Mere
efficiency is not a legitimate justification. In fact, the legislative history of the Fourth
119 “The rudimentary procedures provided in Goss, where the student’s only defense
would be his own testimony, with no right to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses, to
call his own witnesses, or to present other evidence, do not appear to [be truly meaningful.]”
Ellis, supra note 76, at 423-24.
120 “We promised [the parent] we would not be judgmental or take any of her comments
personally. (That can get difficult when a parent attacks you or a member of your staff . . . )”
How I Handled . . . A Parent Who Thought Her Son’s Suspension Was Unfair, EDUC. WORLD,
http://www.educationworld.com/a_admin/ how_i_handled/how_i_handled015.shtml (last
visited Feb. 8, 2016).
121 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see also Ellis, supra note 76, at 423; Henry J. Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275-76 (1975); Note, Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1527 (1975).
122

See Ellis, supra note 76, at 423.

123

Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see Ellis, supra note 76, at 423.

“Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy
its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see also Ellis, supra
note 76, at 424.
124

125

Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.

“The Bill of Rights is a list of limits on government power. For example, what the
Founders saw as the natural right of individuals to speak and worship freely was protected by
the First Amendment.” Bill of Rights of the United States of America, BILL OF RIGHTS INST.
(1791), http://www.billofrights institute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/.
126
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Amendment shows how the Founders were opposed to efficiency as a justification
for taking away rights. 127 The Fourth Amendment was created specifically as a way
to prevent general search warrants, which were used for efficiency and
convenience.128 The existence of the Fourth Amendment reasons that efficiency is
not an adequate justification for depriving a person of their rights without due
process.129 In schools, however, it apparently is. 130
Second, the Court created a dangerous precedent that permits binding a certain
class of people and denying them meaningful due process without any rational
public reason other than somehow regarding them as inferior. When a statute binds a
class of people in this way, not only is it arbitrary, but it is invidious, and the Court
will strike it down.131 The Court strikes these statutes down for lacking public reason
for a public good, and thus, violations of the basic principle of legality that laws not
be arbitrary.132 If denying students meaningful due process was intended to somehow
protect the public, then permitting such arbitrary exclusions from school does not
meet those ends whatsoever.133 In fact, it most likely does the opposite because
students subject to arbitrary discipline become confused, angry, and distrusting of
authority.134

See U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION, FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1992)
[hereinafter GPO, FOURTH].
127

128 Id.; see also QUINCY’S MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 1761-72, App.
I, 395-540; 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 106-47 (Wroth & Zobel eds., 1965); OLIVER M.
DICKERSON, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: STUDIES INSCRIBED TO EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE 40 (R. Morris ed.,
1939).
129

GPO FOURTH, supra note 127.

130

Compare GPO FOURTH, supra note 127, with Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.

See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 303-04 (1993); see also
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91-92 (1971); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538
(1942).
131

“[T]o the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-04 (1965).
132

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); see generally Why Some Schools
Want
To
Expel
Suspensions,
NPR
(June
2,
2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/06/02/188125079/why-some-schools-want-to-expel-suspensions
[hereinafter NPR].
133

““All the research says that [being suspended] contributes to [students’] disengagement
from school.” NPR, supra note 133. “Not only has she lost faith in school officials, Cortes
said, but so has her 15-year-old son, who struggled to wrap his head around the idea that he
was being punished for possibly saving someone’s life last week.” Peter Holley, The
‘Infuriating’ Saga of the Texas Teen Suspended After Rescuing a Classmate, WASH. POST
(Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/27/theinfuriating-saga-of-the-eighth-grader-suspended-after-rescuing-an-asthmatic-classmate/.
134
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C. Some Kind of Discrimination
This is not the first time students—or juveniles—have been grouped together,
deemed as inferior, and subjected to discrimination. In 1964, a fifteen-year-old
Arizona boy was arrested for making “lewd phone calls.”135 At the delinquency
hearing, the boy did not have an attorney, his accuser was not present, no witnesses
were sworn in, and no transcript was made. 136 At the close of the hearing, the boy
was ordered to confinement at the State Industrial School until he turned twentyone.137 Because Arizona did not permit appeals in juvenile cases, the boy’s parents
filed a habeas petition for the boy’s release, which was dismissed. 138 The parents
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and heard the case of In
re Gault in 1967.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded and held that minors adjudicated in
the juvenile court system were entitled to the same level of due process as adults in
the criminal court system.139 Respondents argued that juvenile courts existed to help
children, not to punish them, and that this difference meant that full due process
rights were not necessary.140 The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that although
the two court systems served different purposes, a juvenile’s liberty was as much at
stake in a juvenile delinquency hearing as an adult’s liberty in a criminal case. 141
Accordingly, the Court held that juveniles are not different as a class of people and
are entitled to a fair trial. 142
A few years after Gault in the case of In re Winship, the Court held that the
burden of proof in delinquency cases be equal to the burden in adult criminal
cases.143 New York’s juvenile code set the burden of proof for delinquency hearings
to a preponderance of the evidence. 144 A juvenile judged delinquent appealed,
arguing that juveniles, like adults, were entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt
when charged with a violation of criminal law. 145 New York argued that the state
was not denying juveniles their constitutional rights because juvenile adjudications

135

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1967).

136

Id. at 7.

137

Id.

138

Id.

Id. at 57-59; see Janet Friedman Stansby, In Re Gault: Children Are People, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 1204 (1967).
139

140

Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-15.

141 See, e.g., Curtis C. Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A. J.
719, 720 (1962) (“The basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has the right
to have someone take care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial privilege,
the law must do so.”).
142

Gault, 387 U.S. at 57-59.

143

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1970).

144

Id.; N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).

145

Winship, 397 U.S. at 375-76.
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are not convictions that affect any rights or privileges, the proceedings are not
criminal, and delinquency status itself was not a crime. 146
The Court rejected that argument and held that juveniles were no less vulnerable
to “dubious and unjust convictions with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and
property” than adults in the criminal system. 147 The Court reasoned that the
constitutional rights guaranteed to secure a fair trial were the very root of the judicial
system and no “civil labels and good intentions” could obviate the need for full due
process rights in juvenile courts.148
The Gault and Winship decisions both acknowledged that juvenile status does not
justify truncation of due process rights when life, liberty, or property is at stake.149
However, just five years after the Winship case, Goss held that status as a juvenile is
a justification to truncate juveniles rights when their property interest in attending
school is threatened.150 The Goss majority reasoned that affording full due process
rights during a disciplinary hearing was unreasonable because the extra time taken to
provide students with proper hearings would interfere with the efficient and smooth
functioning of a school.151 However, Winship expressly rejected that argument, and
the Court stated that full due process rights in juvenile adjudications would not
disturb the state’s juvenile court system, “nor will there be any effect on the
informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing at which the factfinding takes
place.”152 Goss took a step back, ignoring the Gault and Winship line of cases which
establish that juveniles as a class are entitled to full due process rights. 153
Accordingly, Goss permitted discrimination against a class of people for no other
reason than somehow deeming them as inferior. 154 Arguably, Goss opened the door
for future invidious acts that permit similar discrimination. 155
D. Discipline Goes Beyond the Classroom
A discussion of the scope of the effect that disciplinary actions have on students
outside of school was notably missing from Goss’s majority and dissenting opinions.
On the surface, a school suspension is an insignificant moment on a person’s path to
adulthood and becomes irrelevant once the student finishes school. As it turns out,
however, student disciplinary records that include punishments as “severe” as an
146

Id.; see also W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1969).

147 Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488
(1895)).
148

Id. at 364-65.

149

See id.; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57-59 (1967).

150 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); see also Larry Bartlett & James
McCullagh, Exclusion from the Educational Process in the Public Schools: What Process is
Now Due, 1993 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 1, 1 (1993).
151

Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.

152

See id.; see also Winship, 397 U.S. at 366.

153

Friedman, supra note 95, at 166-68.

But see Glenn W. Soden, Constitutional Law: Student Rights Under the Due Process
Clause . . . Suspensions from Public Schools, 8 AKRON L. REV. 570, 574 (1975).
154

155

Ellis, supra note 76, at 430.
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out-of-school suspension or expulsion do not lose their relevance after graduation;
they do not remain within the walls of the school.156 Some college applications,
scholarships, and even the Character and Fitness Questionnaire for the Bar Exam
require the disclosure of school suspensions. 157 Severe disciplinary actions could
cause an individual to be denied admission into college or denied scholarship funds
to pay for college if he or she were admitted.158
This matters because it puts students at a disadvantage in a society that so greatly
values higher education.159 In a country that has turned away from the manufacturing
industry and towards the service industry, the public hears almost daily that everyone
should go to college and every child should seek higher education. 160 Accordingly, if
higher education is as important as the public is told, why is it okay that this
important component of future success be jeopardized by a single administrator’s
discretion and a poorly written code of conduct? 161
When a person’s liberty is at stake, due process affords the accused protections
from arbitrary actions and provides the accused with a fair trial.162 Due process
156

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75.

157 See Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Most Colleges Weigh Student Discipline Records in
Admissions,
EDUC.
WEEK
(May
29,
2015),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2015/05/29/most-colleges-weigh-student-discipline-records-in.html. Furthermore, the
Common Application, which is accepted, preferred, or even required by many universities,
insists on disclosure of school suspensions or expulsions. THE COMMON APPLICATION,
https://www.commonapp.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
158 “The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.” Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Arguably, a student denied admission to college or funds to pay for school are not free to
pursue any livelihood or lawful calling.

“The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge
as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.” Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); see also HARVARD UNIV., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE vii (2000).
159

160 Stephanie Ebbs, First Lady Michelle Obama Raps ‘You Should Go to College,’ ABC
NEWS
(Dec.
10,
2015),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lady-michelle-obama-rapscollege/story?id=35689604; Mark Gongloff, Why You Should Really Go To College, In 2
Charts, HUFFPOST BUS. (updated Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/20/
college-income-premium_n_6720902.html; College for All: Is Obama’s Goal Attainable,
NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com /id/29445201/n s/us_newseducation/t/college-all-obamas-goal-attainable/#.Vq-ob7IrKM8.

Such administrative discretion could include personal animosity towards a student for
previous behavioral issues.
161

162 See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (describing writ as “bulwark against convictions that
violate ‘fundamental fairness’”); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“[D]enial of
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means the accused knew which behaviors were prohibited. 163 It also means that the
accused was able to comply with the law and was not subject to an arbitrary
command that made the accused guilty from the start.164 Due process acknowledges
the values, norms and rules by which a person as a human being should be treated
and respects them.165 Yet, when a child’s future is at stake, Goss’s due process
provides no protection from arbitrary actions. 166 If the United States is a nation of the
rule of law, not men, then why does it permit the rule of men to hold a child back
from his or her full potential? Children who are suspended from school are twice as
likely to drop out of high school, and students who drop out are three times as likely
to one day become incarcerated.167 This relationship is known as the school-to-prison
pipeline.168 Thus, a suspension from school has real ramifications for that child as it
could set him on a destructive path that could ultimately lead to prison.169
Furthermore, subjecting these children to arbitrary discipline can create feelings
of distrust and antagonism towards authority figures or even prevent these students
from wanting to help people in the future for fear that their involvement could be
punished.170 For example, on January 14, 2016, Hugo Marquez, a student at an
Oklahoma City school, was suspended until the end of May for defending a friend
during a fight.171 In a cellphone video of the incident, Marquez is seen walking
due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice.”).
163 “In some instances, however, school policies are overbroad or unclear, and students
may not know they are violating school rules.” Gesaman, supra note 90.
164

See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965).

165

Charles, supra note 38, at 477-502; BARNETT, supra note 39, at 73.

See Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 935 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2007); Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588
F.Supp.2d 606, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
166

167 See, e.g., Augustine Reyes, The Criminalization of Student Discipline Programs and
Adolescent Behavior, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 73, 95 (2006) (explaining that by
sending adolescents to county detention centers and juvenile, county, or municipal courts for
behavior issues like dress code violations and food fights, schools are criminalizing irksome
juvenile behavior and prepping students for the school to prison pipeline); Daniel J. Losen,
Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s
Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 257 (2004) (describing how adult prisons
and juvenile justice systems are stocked with black youths who fell into a school-to-prison
pipeline). See also COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, Abandoned in the Back Row: New Lessons
in Education and Delinquency Prevention (2001), http://chhi.podconsulting.net/assets/
documents/news/Final%20Jena%20Testimony.pdf.
168

COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 167.

See Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment:
Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 341, 342-43 (2003).
169

170 Sheldra Brigham, “I Guess I Got Knocked Out,” Oklahoma City High School Student
Responds to Viral Fight Video, KFOR NBC NEWSCHANNEL4, http://kfor.com/2016/01/14/iguess-i-got-knocked-out-oklahoma-city-high-school-student-responds-to-viral-fight-video/
(last updated Jan. 14, 2016).
171

Id.
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towards the fight and standing with his hands in his pockets in between his friend
and the aggressor.172 While Marquez stands between the two other boys, the
aggressor punches Marquez in the face hard enough that Marquez falls and lays on
the ground unconscious.173 In an interview for Oklahoma City’s local NBC News
affiliate, Marquez stated that he regrets getting involved in the fight because now no
one is standing up for him.174 Because Marquez tried to stand up for a friend and
peacefully end a fight, he might not graduate as planned in May.175 This disciplinary
action sent mixed messages to Marquez because now, due to this suspension, he no
longer sees the value in getting involved. 176 Suspension taught this student that he
should remain a passive bystander.177
Unfortunately, Marquez is not alone. On January 25, 2016, Anthony Ruelas, a
Texas student, was suspended from school for helping a classmate who was having
an acute asthma attack, which the school qualified as “disobeying a teacher.” 178 The
teacher acknowledged the girl’s asthma attack and emailed the school nurse per
school policy.179 While the teacher waited for a response, the girl fell to the floor in
extreme distress.180 Upon seeing this, Ruelas refused to allow the teacher to wait any
longer.181 He picked up the girl and carried her directly to the school’s main office. 182
And what did the school do? It suspended him for disobeying his teacher’s orders to
let this girl writhe on the floor in severe distress while the teacher waited for the
Dallas Franklin, 5 Students Arrested After Brutal Fight is Caught on Camera at
Oklahoma
City
High
School,
KFOR
NBC
NEWSCHANNEL
4,
http://kfor.com/2016/01/13/increased-police-presence-at-oklahoma-city-high-school-afterbrutal-fight-is-caught-on-camera/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2016).
172

173

Id.

174

Brigham, supra note 170.

175

Id.

176 “Yeah, and it’s not really cause [sic] I got knocked out. The fact that everybody left
after they seen how I was. No one helped me up.” Id.

“Threats of severe punishments, such as suspensions . . . may actually discourage
children and adults from reporting bullying that they observe.” Misdirections in Bullying
Prevention and Intervention, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/prevention/inthe-community/community-action-planning/misdirections-in-prevention-tipsheet.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2016).
177

178 Teen Suspended for Helping Friend Won’t Return to School, ABC NEWSNET 5
CLEVELAND,
http://www.newsnet5.com/news/national/teen-suspended-for-helping-friendwont-return-to-school (last updated Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Teen Suspended]; Holley,
supra note 134.
179

Teen Suspended, supra note 178; Holley, supra note 134.

180 “The way he talks about Trishica’s asthma attack—the little things he says, like how
she was grasping [sic] for air, the way her body was moving—it really scared him.” Holley,
supra note 134.
181 “When he saw a life possibly slipping away, he reacted instinctively, his mother said.
It’s possible, she said, that her son understood what was going on better than his teacher: He
has two cousins with asthma, one of whom slipped into a coma after a severe asthma attack.”
Id.
182

Id.
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nurse to respond to the email. 183 In a statement, the school said they “applaud[] the
efforts of students who act in good faith to assist others in times of need.” 184 And
what better way to show its appreciation than by suspending this boy from school.
These scenarios are all made possible by Goss, an opinion that fails to show any
understanding of the true significance that school disciplinary actions can have on a
person outside of the school. To its credit, the Court did address possible reputation
damage or emotional distress that severe disciplinary actions could have on a
student.185 However, this minor discussion failed to truly explore the impressionable
and delicate psyche of a child because—after all—these are children, and they might
not be able to process such conflicting messages. 186
Furthermore, the Justice Powell’s dissent goes so far as to state that any arbitrary
actions could be remedied within the school and not through the judicial system. 187
Justice Powell’s statement was incorrect because a quick glance at the case law that
has piled up in the wake of Goss would show that many arbitrary actions still take
place which are not remedied within the school.188 As it turns out, it is nearly
impossible for a student to remedy an arbitrary action at all because the courts are
still reluctant to intervene in an area where almost all discretion has been given to
schools to make their own decisions.189
In order to remedy an arbitrary action, a student must appeal the suspension to
the school board, which, similar to a court, might be reluctant to substitute its
discretion for that of the school principal. 190 If, and basically when, the
administration upholds the action, the only other option would be to take the school
to court. As Goss established, schools only violate student rights if they fail to
provide this minimal notice and subpar hearing.191 Disciplinary actions short of
“Within minutes [Ruelas] had been written up . . . and [Ruelas’s mother] received a call
from school officials telling her that her son had been suspended for walking out of class.” Id.
Now imagine if dialing 911 included a delay similar to the delay created by the policy at this
school.
183

184

Teen Suspended, supra note 178.

185

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).

Meg Wagner, Ohio Teen Commits Suicide After School Staffers Accused Him of
Smelling Like Pot at Homecoming Dance, Friend Says: ‘He Was Directly Told That He had
Ruined His Life,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ohio-teenkills-school-officials-verbal-attack-article-1.2388707 (last updated Oct. 7, 2015).
186

187

Goss, 419 U.S. at 594.

The substantial amount of case law does not account for situations involving arbitrary
discipline that did not make it to court for financial or personal reasons.
188

189 See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985); Bd. of Curators
of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1978); Goss, 419 U.S. at 585-86 (1975)
(Powell, J., dissenting).

OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015); see Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 579 (6th Cir.
2007); Grine v. Sylvania Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. L-04-1137, 2004 WL 2924335 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 2004); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Revere Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 20275,
2001 WL 489980, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2055 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
190

191 OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985);
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
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involving physical abuse that would shock the conscious are foolproof and
practically guaranteed to be upheld.192
Now, going back to Susy’s suspension, Goss established that Susy has a property
interest in attending school. Because the U.S. Constitution protects Susy from
deprivation of property without due process of law, the school cannot deprive Susy
of her equal access to public education without due process. Here, due process
consists of notice and a hearing described in Goss. Susy’s school provided her with
notice. The school informed Susy as to the reason for her suspension. Susy’s school
also provided her with a hearing. The administration gave her an opportunity to be
heard by requiring her to make a statement, which was supposedly read by the
principal. Because the school provided notice and a hearing consistent with the
requirements in Goss, the school provided due process of law. Therefore, Susy’s
property interest in attending school was not arbitrarily deprived without due process
of law. Accordingly, the school’s disciplinary action did not violate any of Susy’s
civil rights. Thus, Susy has no legal claim to support her feeling that the suspension
was inherently wrong.
V. STUDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO MEANINGFUL DUE PROCESS
Because Goss is not protecting students as intended, there needs to be legislative
intervention. Specifically, the state legislatures need to establish a model student
code of conduct that properly defines what the prohibited behaviors are. The notice
requirement of Goss, while noble, mostly fails due to the lack of uniformity,
specificity, and clarity in student codes of conduct. 193 “Goss notice” lacks any
protective power because it only requires schools to justify and tell students of the
reason for suspension, but the standard does not require the reason to be
legitimate.194 Any behavior that a staff member finds objectionable could be legally
punishable so long as the school can fit that behavior into one of several ambiguous
categories of prohibited conduct.195
Currently, each school district has a different code of conduct that, while
prohibiting mainly the same types of behaviors, fails to provide adequate notice of
what the prohibited behaviors truly are. Some banned behaviors like “gambling” are
well defined in that students have adequate notice that they are prohibited from
“engaging in any games of chance.”196 However, while some schools define
gambling as engaging in a game of chance, others schools include possession of
playing cards and dice under “gambling” because they are “gambling paraphernalia”
See generally Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994); B.B. v
Appleton Area Sch. Dist., No. 12-C-115, 2013 WL 3972250, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107392
(E.D. Wis. 2013).
192

193 See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
194

Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.

Id. at 574 (conceding that the state’s authority to prescribe standards for discipline is
very broad).
195

196 GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY, supra note 100; HAMILTON
TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100; IRONTON HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENT/PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100; MARIETTA HIGH SCHOOL HANDBOOK, supra
note 100; REVERE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100.
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or could potentially “facilitate gambling.”197 While it is true that playing cards could
potentially facilitate gambling, the concept of gambling facilitation is not, by nature,
within the scope of mere possession of playing cards. 198 For such a small topic, the
school districts have managed to include a wide range of behavior for which a
student could face suspension. Accordingly, a model code of conduct that uniformly
defines prohibited behaviors would drastically improve the efficacy and protection
of notice contemplated in Goss.199
Returning to the headlines from the beginning of this Note, many of those
children would not have been suspended for those particular behaviors had schools
actually given adequate notice to students as to which behaviors were prohibited
beforehand. For the student who purchased “sugar crack,” while the administration
believed she had purchased drugs or drug paraphernalia, she did not actually
purchase drugs.200 She bought a bag of sugar and Kool-Aid powder that other
students referred to as “happy crack” because sugar allegedly makes children
hyperactive.201 Instead of suspending this student, the school could have used the
situation as a learning experience to teach students that drugs need to be taken
seriously and that they should not jokingly apply the names of narcotics to every day
substances. If the school still felt it necessary to punish the student for possessing a
bag of sugar, a detention would have sufficed. It would have gotten the school’s
point across without potentially affecting this child’s future. She did not need to miss
school over a bag of sugar.
The Goss hearing requirement also needs legislative intervention, as it is frankly
worthless. The school only is required to hear what the student says and not actually
197

GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY, supra note 100.

Upon searching “why can’t you have playing cards in school” on Google, the author
finds a Yahoo Answers conversation in which a teacher asks the general public why they think
playing cards are banned in school because the teacher “need[s] a good reason to tell my
students.” The teacher clearly does not see supposed inherent questionable nature of playing
cards, and based on the answers, neither does the general public. d dawg, Why is Playing
Cards
in
Class/School
Bad?
YAHOO
ANSWERS
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080529201022AApDYRN (last visited
Nov. 20, 2016). Another page asks the public to debate whether or not Pokémon Cards should
be allowed in schools because, apparently, Pokémon Cards are also a topic of contention.
Should
Pokemon
Cards
be
Allowed
in
Schools?,
DEBATE.ORG,
http://www.debate.org/opinions/should-pokemon-cards-be-allowed-in-schools (last visited
Nov. 13, 2016).
198

199 Section 3313.666 of the Ohio Revised Code is an example of a state law which guides
school districts in the creation of their conduct policies. Under R.C. § 3313.666(B), schools
are required to implement a policy that prohibits the harassment, intimidation, or bullying of
another student on school grounds, on a school bus, or any school-sponsored event. This law
is specific without tying the hands of school administrators. While many school districts
include a detailed harassment policy pursuant to this law, many other schools remain in
violation because there is no government body to monitor the contents of these codes of
conduct. The violations are only discovered when a private party looks into it. O HIO REV.
CODE § 3313.66 (2015).

Bash, supra note 1. In an interview with News Channel 5, the eighth grade student said
she had never seen cocaine before and that the substance the students called “happy crack”
was just sugar and Kool-Aid which was consumed by licking it off their finger.
200

201

Id.
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investigate the matter further.202 The fact that this procedural requirement pits a
student’s word against a staff member means that the student almost always will
lose.203 Because exclusion from school does not magically become irrelevant upon
graduation, exclusion needs to be taken more seriously, and students need more
procedural safeguards than just the opportunity to be heard. The legislature needs to
mandate procedures that force school administrators to consider the whole student
and not just whatever incident landed him or her in the principal’s office. Students
should be permitted to argue their side of the story. If that means other students
making statements as witnesses, then so be it because possible exclusion is
extremely serious.
Furthermore, students deserve impartial appellate panels. As of now, Ohio’s state
law only mandates that there be an appeals process beyond the initial disciplinary
hearing.204 This typically amounts to a student making a statement either in front of
the superintendent and two board members or to three local board members. 205
Similar to the “opportunity to be heard” standard at the disciplinary level, this appeal
will typically be fruitless because, again, why would local board members believe
this student’s word against what staff and the principal believe happened. 206 The
legislature needs to mandate that the appeals hearings for disciplinary actions
consider the whole student as well. Again, if this means student witness statements
or even other staff members making statements in support of the student’s character,
then so be it. Such additions to hearing procedures would not unduly burden school
administrators because it only requires a few additional precautions before formally
excluding a student from school. The minimal hearing that administrators are
required to hold now does not consider how this exclusion from school could affect a
student’s future.207 They are only thinking of the present circumstances.
202 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975); see also C.Y. ex rel. Antone v. Lakeview
Pub. Sch., 557 F. App’x 426, 426 (6th Cir. 2014); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352,
1359 (6th Cir. 1996); Ellis, supra note 76.
203 People tend to trust the word of authority figures more than their own instincts merely
because the figure is in that position of authority. Stanley Milgrim, Behavior Study of
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 375-77 (1963).

“The superintendent or principal, within one school day after the time of a pupil's
expulsion or suspension, shall notify in writing the parent, guardian, or custodian of the pupil
and the treasurer of the board of education of the expulsion or suspension. The notice shall
include the reasons for the expulsion or suspension, notification of the right of the pupil or the
pupil's parent, guardian, or custodian to appeal the expulsion or suspension to the board of
education or to its designee.” OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66(D) (2015).
204

See generally STUDENT DISCIPLINE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURES: A GUIDE FOR
ADVOCATES, EDUCATION LAW CENTER (Elizabeth Athos et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012),
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/StudentDisciplineRights_Guide_20
12.pdf; THE PARENT’S GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING STUDENT DISCIPLINE POLICIES AND
PRACTICES IN VIRGINIA SCHOOLS, VIRGINIA DEP’T OF EDUCATION (2008),
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/support/student_conduct/parents_guide_student_discipline_polici
es.pdf.
205

206 See generally STANLEY MILGRIM , OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW
(1969).
207 “The only cost to the school would be the time spent by the person checking the
information given by the student and could be done with minimal disruption of either teachers
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As a further procedural safeguard, students need to have the opportunity to
appeal their disciplinary action outside of the local school system before seeking
judicial intervention. This could be accomplished by establishing an additional level
of appeals at the county level or state board of education. Again, this additional level
of appeals should permit the student to have the chance to make a real case for what
happened and how the exclusion unfairly burdens him or her as opposed to another
“opportunity to be heard.” Students have the opportunity to be heard. What they do
not have is the opportunity to have their statements be taken seriously and for their
disciplinary actions to be scrutinized by an impartial third party.
VI. CONCLUSION
Goss ultimately created a no-win situation for students when it tried to protect
them. One concern addressed in Justice Powell’s dissent was that this notice and
hearing requirement laid out in the majority opinion was so ambiguous that it did not
amount to any protection at all.208 Justice Powell, as it turned out, was rightly
concerned. “Some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing” have been the central
issues surrounding Goss, and their practical application has not lead to any
substantive protection of student interests.
The Goss Court sought to create further protections for students while not
impinging on the discretion given to school administrations. However, while trying
not to tie the hands of administrators, the Goss Court undermined the rights of
students and truncated the civil rights they are entitled to while in school. While it is
understandable that the Court did not want to unduly burden educational quality and
efficiency, it still should not have done so by truncating students’ right to due
process. The majority believed that the students’ rights were not as important as the
faculty’s needs, but because school disciplinary actions can follow a person into
adulthood just like a criminal record, students should be afforded the full protections
afforded to those in the criminal justice system. 209
Many of Goss’s shortcomings could be solved—or at the very least lessened—
with legislative intervention. Notice could be improved if legislatures were to create
uniform codes of conduct that adequately defined prohibited behaviors in a way that
gave meaningful notice to students beforehand as well as taking some of the
arbitrary discretion away from staff members. The hearing requirement could be
fixed if the legislature implemented procedural protections that more closely
mirrored the protections enjoyed by those in the criminal justice system, such as the
right to put on a real, meaningful case, confront the accuser, and present evidence
and witnesses. Furthermore, students would benefit if their appellate hearings had
more procedural safeguards akin to the criminal justice system. And finally, there
needs to be an additional level of appeal before a student must turn to the justice
system for relief.
or students. While some may argue that this could be substantial given the great frequency of
suspensions in our school systems today, it is small compared to the reduced risk of error that
would result and may instill in the accused student the belief that his opportunity to explain
his position was more than a formal meaningless gesture.” Dennis J. Christensen, Democracy
in the Classroom: Due Process and School Discipline, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 705, 719-20 (1975).
208
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In conclusion, although Goss tried to help students, it ultimately failed. Until
state legislatures implement more procedural safeguards, we are doing a disservice
to our students by subjecting them to the proverbial mine field that is “being a
student.”
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